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INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization's Appellate Body rulings in United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
("Shrimp/Turtle")' created a new baseline for the labor and
environment debate at the World Trade Organization ("WTO").2
These landmark decisions effectively rejected (without citing!) the
1. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle I]), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/58ABR.DOC (last visited
July 18, 2003); see also United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia,
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle II] (upholding the
Panel's finding that Article XX of GATT 1994 justified the U.S. measure),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/58ABRW.doc
(last visited June 25, 2003).
2. See Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case:
A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 491, 508 (2002) (discussing, inter alia, the Appellate Body's use of
international environmental standards to determine whether the discriminatory
behavior of the United States was justifiable).
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previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") holding
in United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna Case
("Tuna/Dolphin"),3 where the panel ruled that Article XX limits
exporting countries from using market access measures on policy
grounds.4 The basic logic of the Appellate Body's ruling applies to,
inter alia, Article XX(a).5
Before Shrimp/Turtle, conventional wisdom had it that the
framework of Article XX could not justify the trade embargoes
targeted at other countries' environmental and labor policies.6 On the
other hand, it was also conventional wisdom that conditions relating
to environmental and labor policies could be placed on voluntary and
non-binding preferences granted to developing countries under the
Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") without violating GATT
provisions.7 Initially a waiver8 and later on a Tokyo Round decision,
called the "Enabling Clause," exempted GSP treatment from the
Most Favored Nation ("MFN") requirement in Article 1.9 The issues
3. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on Mexican Complaint Concerning
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R - 39S/155, 1991
GATTPD LEXIS I (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin].
4. See id.
5. See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, para. 121.
6. See Howse, supra note 2, at 492 (arguing that Article XX provided a
mechanism for justifying environmental trade measures); see also Steve
Charnovitz, A Critical Guide to the WTO's Report on Trade Environment, 14
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 341, 345 (1997) (discussing the dispute surrounding the
scope of Article XX exceptions).
7. See Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W. Staiger, The
Boundaries of the WTO: It's a Question of Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56,
71-72 (describing the European Union's new GSP framework that includes
incentives for compliance with certain labor and environmental standards by
developing beneficiary nations).
8. See GATT Secretariat, Waiver: Generalized System of Preferences, Jun. 25,
1971, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1972) [hereinafter GSP Decision]
(pronouncing that the Contracting Parties to GATT agreed to employ GSP
preferences to assist developing nations), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/gsp.pdf (last visited July 28, 2003).
9. See GATT Secretariat, Decision on Differential and More Favorable
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28,
1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause] (stating
again that the Contracting Parties decided to institute preferential tariff
2003] 1335
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India proposed to bring before the WTO dispute settlement process
are: (1) how broad or narrow this exemption is, and (2) to what
extent dispute settlement could police this exemption, based on
scrutiny of whether the "conditions" of the Enabling Clause are met °
After Shrimp/Turtle, there were many who thought that the focus
on the environmental and social agenda had shifted to political and
diplomatic negotiations within the WTO and other international
organizations." In late 2002, however, India brought its complaint
before the Appellate Body to challenge the European Union's
("EU") use of market access measures on policy grounds in its
GSP.'2 India's claim tested conventional wisdom that such measures
fell outside WTO's legal scrutiny.'3 The claim specifically addressed
market access measures justified by labor, environmental, and drug
arrangements on an individual-member basis to assist developing nations),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/enabling1979_e.htm#fntext I (last
visited August 19, 2003).
10. See European Communities-Conditions for Granting of Tariff Preferences
to India, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India, WT/DS246/4 (Dec. 9,
2002) [hereinafter Indian Panel Request] (communicating India's view that EC
tariff preferences to developing countries were inconsistent with the GATT 1994
and did not meet the requirements set out in the Enabling Clause), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/246-4.doc (last visited July
18, 2003).
11. See Howse, supra note 2, at 491.
12. See Indian Panel Request, supra note 10 (cataloging India's complaints
with the EC GSP scheme).
13. See European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, Request to Join Consultations,
Communication from Columbia, WT/DS246/3 (Apr. 5, 2002) (requesting to join in
the consultations between the European Union and India concerning conditions for
granting GSP preferences to developing countries), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/246-3.doc (last visited July
18, 2003); see also, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, Request to Join Consultations,
Communication from Venezuela, WT/DS246/2, Mar. 25, 2002 (requesting to be
joined in the consultations between the European Union and India concerning
conditions for granting GSP preferences to developing countries), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/246-2.doc (last visited July
18, 2003). Colombia, Venezuela, and Thailand, unlike India, have not filed
requests for a panel. Id.
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enforcement concerns. 4 India dropped any arguments concerning the
labor and environmental incentives in its first submission to the
panel. Nevertheless, the general jurisprudential approach that the
panel and Appellate Body adopted in this case would likely impact
future litigation concerning labor and environmental conditionality in
GSP schemes, as well as other kinds of differential treatment.
This essay examines India's original legal claim as far as it
concerns environmental and labor incentives, and how the Appellate
Body interprets its strengths and weaknesses under WTO law today.
The conclusion presents various possible outcomes of a challenge to
such preferences.
The EU measures that India challenged are unlike the typical
conditionality measures imposed in GSP schemes. 5 For instance,
both the European Union and the United States provide for
withdrawal of GSP treatment altogether where there is a record of
serious abuse of workers. 6 India's challenge did not concern the
14. See Indian Panel Request, supra note 10 (noting the anti-drug production
and trafficking scheme under the EC GSP scheme).
15. See Council Regulation 2501/01 on Applying a Scheme of Generalised
Tariff Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, 2001
O.J. (L 346) 1 [hereinafter EC GSP Scheme] (providing the GSP scheme),
available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sgadoc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc
&lg=EN&numdoc=32001R2501&model=guichett (last visited June 26, 2003); see
also Handbook on the Scheme of the European Community, U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development, UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/MISC.25/Rev.2 (2002) (helping
the exposition of the scheme for special preferential treatment that is challenged by
India) available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//itcdtsbmiksc25rev2_en.pdf
(last visited June 27, 2003).
16. See SOPHIE DUFOUR, ACCORDS COMMERCIAUX ET DROITS DES
TRAVAILLEURS 42-86 (Les ltditions Revue de Droit de l'Universit& de Sherbrooke
1998) (discussing the history of regional and bilateral labor rights programs in the
European Union); see also Kimberly Ann Elliot, Preferences for Workers?
Worker's Rights and the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, Speech Before
the Faculty Spring Conference at the Institute for International Economics (May 8,
2000) (presenting a more recent discussion of the U.S. GSP scheme) at
http://wwwiie.com/publications/papers/elliott0598.htm (last visited June 27,
2003). "The U.S. experience in applying worker rights conditionality to trade
benefits under the GSP suggests that external pressure can be helpful in improving
treatment of workers in developing countries and that linkage of trade and worker
rights need not devolve into simple protectionism." Id.
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possibility of a total withdrawal from the GSP when egregious
violations of labor rights occur.'I India instead opposed EU measures
that provide an additional margin of preference to countries that
effectively monitor and enforce International Labor Organization
("ILO") conventions that promulgate fundamental rights."i Similarly,
the environmental conditionality grants a margin of preference
beyond that generally accorded under the GSP scheme of the
European Communities ("EC"). Tropical timber products from
countries that implement, monitor, and enforce internationally
acknowledged standards and guidelines for sustainable forest
management obtain an additional margin of preference. 9
I. THE ENABLING CLAUSE AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE 1: 1 OF THE GATT
India claimed in its request for a panel that the labor and
environmental conditionality in the EC GSP scheme violated the
17. See Indian Panel Request, supra note 10 (requesting that the panel examine
the EC GSP regime for consistency with the GATT without challenging the
propriety of total withdrawal by the European Union in cases of egregious labor
rights violations in beneficiary country).
18. See International Labor Organization Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, June 1998 [hereinafter ILO Declaration]
(expressing international agreement with the adoption of basic labor rights),
available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/stanfards/decl/declaration/text/index.htm (last
visited June 27, 2003). The core conventions of the International Labor
Organization ("ILO") are conventions 29 and 105 (concerning forced labor),
conventions 87 and 98 (concerning collective bargaining), conventions 100 and
Il1 (concerning non-discrimination), and convention 138 (concerning child labor).
International Labor Organization, ILOLEX Database of International Labor
Standards (cataloguing ILO conventions), available at
http://ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567/english/convdisp 1 .htm (last visited Jun. 30, 2003).
19. See International Tropical Timber Organization, ITTO Guidelines for the
Restoration, Management and Rehabilitation of Degraded and Secondary Tropical
Forests, 13 ITTO POL. DEV. SERIES 1, 3 [hereinafter ITTO Guidelines] (describing
guidelines for forest conservation and management), available at
http://www.itto.or.jp/policy/guidelines/download/E-Guidelines.pdf (last visited
June 27, 2003).
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MFN obligation in Article 1: 1 of the GATT.2" However, the Enabling
Clause limits the applicability of Article 1:1 to GSP preferences.2 '
Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause specifically states:
"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General
Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more
favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such
treatment to other contracting parties. '22 By virtue of Paragraph 2(a),
this override of Article I applies to "[p]referential tariff treatment
accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in
developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of
Preferences."23
India conceded that the Enabling Clause affected the application
of GATT Article I to GSP schemes.24 However, India attacked the
EC scheme on grounds it was inconsistent with several provisions of
the Enabling Clause. Because of this non-compliance with what
India claimed to be legal requirements of the Enabling Clause, the
EC, according India, could not benefit from the Article I override in
Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause.25
Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause requires that preferential
tariff treatment be consistent with the GSP.2 6 India argued that the
kind of conditionality that exists in the labor and environmental
provisions at issue was not compatible with the notion of a
20. See Indian Panel Request, supra note 10 (requesting establishment of a
dispute panel to examine whether the EC GSP scheme violates Article 1: 1 of the
GATT).
21. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 1 (applying differential and more
favorable treatment provisions to GSP measures).
22. Id.
23. Id. para. 2(a).
24. See Indian Panel Request, supra note 10 (noting that India requested
consultations with the European Union pursuant to the Enabling Clause).
25. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 1 (stating that the preferential
treatments outlined in Paragraph 2 constitute the differential and more favorable
treatment to developing countries introduced in Paragraph 1).
26. See id. para. 2(a) (applying the Enabling Clause to preferential treatment of
"products originating in developing countries in accordance with the GSP).
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Generalized System of Preferences, particularly the element of non-
discrimination that is fundamental to GSP.27
India also claimed that the EC scheme failed to meet two other
requirements of the Enabling Clause found in Paragraphs 3(a) and
3(c).28 Paragraph 3(a) states that preferences "shall be designed to
facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries in the
context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing
countries and not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for
the trade of any other contracting parties."29 In addition, paragraph
3(c) requires that "preferences be designed, and if necessary,
modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and
trade needs of developing countries. 3 °
A. THE JUSTICIABILITY OF THE ENABLING CLAUSE AND ITS
ALLEGED "REQUIREMENTS"'
A prevalent interpretation of the GSP framework in WTO law is
that the GSP scheme escapes dispute settlement under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding ("DSU") because the language of the
Enabling Clause is permissive and allows for unilateral modification,
27. See Indian Panel Request, supra note 10, at I (noting that the European
Communities only extends certain tariff preferences to countries complying certain
"labour and environmental" standards).
28. See Indian Panel Request, supra' note , at 2 (requesting that the panel
examine whether the European Union violated paragraphs 3(a) and 3(c) of the
Enabling Clause).
29. Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 3(a) ("[a]ny differential and more
favourable treatment provided under this clause: (a) shall be designed to facilitate
and promote the trade of developing countries and not to raise barriers to or create
undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties").
30. Id. para. 3(c) ("Any differential and more favourable treatment provided
under this clause: ... (b) shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or
elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation
basis").
31. What follows on this question obviously applies not only to a potential new
or renewed claim on environmental and labor incentives, but to India's actual
modified claim concerning drug preferences.
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extension, or withdrawal from such preferences.32 Yet, as the
outcome of the Shrimp/Turtle dispute illustrates, conventional
wisdom with respect to GATT/WTO law is not a binding authority
and may even turn out wrong.33
In fact, the Appellate Body has been very reluctant to interpret
WTO legal instruments as outside the jurisdiction of the dispute
settlement organs, even where conventional wisdom has been that
the monitoring of such provisions ought to be left, by in large, to
political or diplomatic organs of the WTO.34 Some commentators
criticize such an expansive view of dispute settlement jurisdiction,
and favor deference to the political and diplomatic organs even in the
absence of any formal bar that prevents the DSU from adjudicating
disputes under Article XXIV.35 I believe that judicial restraint, or as I
prefer to call it, institutional sensitivity, should not preempt the
32. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9 (noting that any contracting party may
take unilateral action such as modification or withdrawal of the preferences in the
Enabling Clause).
33. See Howse, supra note 2, at 495 (responding to critics of the Shrimp/Turtle
ruling, who have complained that the AB interpretation of Article XX to permit
trade measures to protect the global environmental commons was contrary to the
"practice" of the GATT, as reflected in the Tuna/Dolphin panels and the purported
wide support among the WTO Membership for the narrower approach in those
reports).
34. See, e.g., Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS34/AB/R, paras. 58, 60 (Oct. 22, 1999)
[hereinafter Turkey - Textiles] (asserting jurisdiction of the dispute settlement
organs of the WTO to assess overall compatibility of customs unions with Article
XXIV), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org: 80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/34ABR.DOC (last visited
July 16, 2003); see also, India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS90/AB/R, paras. 80-83 (Aug. 23, 1999) [hereinafter Balance of Payments]
(examining jurisdictional power and competence of WTO panel regarding India's
balance-of-payments restrictions), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/90ABR.DOC (last visited
July 16, 2003).
35. See Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial and
the Political Organs of the WTO, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 325, 325-46 (Marco
Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000) (arguing that WTO panels should respect
the competence and powers of the political bodies established under WTO
agreements).
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fundamental right to dispute settlement because other organs of the
WTO could monitor or review legal compliance.36 At the same time,
where such political and diplomatic organs within the WTO or other
international institutions are implicated in an area of WTO law (for
example, UNCTAD in the case of the GSP) it is only appropriate that
the views of those organisms be taken into account in dispute
settlement, and especially that expert competence be respected.37
If the Enabling Clause were non-justiciable, then merely by
asserting the applicability of the Enabling Clause, a WTO member
could escape a fundamental legal obligation, such as the MFN with
respect to trade in goods, regardless of how implausible it is that the
Member's measures are a GSP scheme.38 Thus, GATT panels rightly
adjudicated the issue of whether the Article I override in Paragraph 1
of the Enabling Clause applied to a scheme of trade preferences.39 In
United States-Denial of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment as To
Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil ("Rubber Footwear"),40 a GATT
panel examined whether the Enabling Clause would find preferential
36. See Robert Howse, The Least Dangerous Branch? The Extent and Limits of
the Judicial Power in WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence, in THE ROLE OF THE
JUDGE IN THE WTO (Cottier & Mavroidis eds., forthcoming 2003); Howse, supra
note 2, at 519-20 (noting that the AB will not decline a case where the law is
unclear).
37. See Balance of Payments, supra note 34, para. 11 ("Each organ of the
WTO must, in determining the scope of its own powers, proceed with due regard
to the powers of the other organs of the WTO, and with due regard for the rights
and obligations of Members.").
38. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9, at 203 (according preferential tariff
arrangements in goods trade in favor of developing nations).
39. See, e.g., European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale, and
Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R 7.80
(Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Bananas] (finding EC measures to be inconsistent with
the GATT 1994), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/27ABR.WPF (last visited
July 18, 2003).
40. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on Brazil Complaint Concerning United
States - Denial of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear
from Brazil, DS18/R- 39S/128, Jan. 10, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 128
(1992) [hereinafter Rubber Footwear] (finding the United States in violation of
Article 1:1 of the GATT).
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treatment of countervailing duties in violation of Article 1.41 The
panel held that "the Enabling Clause expressly limits the preferential
treatment accorded by developed contracting parties in favour of
developing contracting parties under the Generalized System of
Preferences to tariff preferences only."42 The panel referred to United
States-Customs User Fee,43 which held that the Enabling Clause does
not allow for a non-tariff measure that violates Article I.44
In sum, the Enabling Clause is justiciable. The nature and extent
of the legal obligation created by individual provisions within the
Enabling Clause is, however, another matter.45 In order to ascertain
these legal effects, the standard rules of interpretation in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 46 must be applied to the language
of each provision.
41. See id. para. 4.2 (citing the requests made by the parties with respect to the
U.S. countervailing duty order).
42. Id. para. 6.14.
43. GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada Complaint Concerning United
States - Custom User Fee, L/6264 - 35S/245, Nov. 25, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th
Supp.) at 245 (1988) [hereinafter Customs User Fee] (finding the U.S. processing
fee in violation of the GATT).
44. See id. para. 122 (commenting that the measure at issue was not authorized
by the Enabling Clause, because it authorized preferential tariff and non-tariff
measures for the benefit of developing countries only if such measures conformed
to the Generalized System of Preferences or to instruments multilaterally
negotiated under GATT auspices).
45. See PATRICK LOw, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY
151 (The Twentieth Century Fund Press 1993) (noting that the Enabling Clause
states that developed countries "do not expect to receive reciprocal commitments
from developing countries that are inconsistent with the latter's individual
development, financial, and trade needs," while also stating that "developing
countries expect to participate more fully in the framework of GATT rights and
obligations as their development and trade situation improves," which gives rise to
"endless debate and disagreement in the GATT").
46. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (laying
out the procedures by which countries must abide by and properly interpret treaty
obligations).
47. See id. art. 31 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose."). See generally, Peter C. Maki, Interpreting
GATT Using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Method to Increase
20031 1343
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Not all provisions in WTO Agreements have the effect of "hard"
legal obligations. In European Communities - Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products ("Beef Hormones"),4 8 the Appellate Body
found that certain provisions of the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement") resemble "best efforts"
obligations, where WTO members progressively achieve certain
goals without a binding legal commitment to reach certain results in
the future.49 Based on its reading of the Preamble of the SPS
Agreement, and other considerations, the Appellate Body found that
it wds unreasonable to interpret Article 3.1 as imposing an immediate
and absolute obligation on members to base all of their regulations
on international standards.50 The Appellate Body concluded that the
presence of mandatory language, here the word "shall," cannot itself
the Legitimacy of the Dispute Settlement System, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 343
(2000) (arguing that by applying the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties, the
WTO may increase the legitimacy of decisions, the confidence of parties in getting
predictable results, and subsequently increase the amount of negotiation for new
tariff concessions and reduce tariffs).
48: See European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16,
1998) [hereinafter Beef Hormones] (holding that certain EC measures related to
the treatment of hormone treated meat were not in conformity with the SPS
Agreement), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/26ABR.WPF (last visited July
16, 2003).
49. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
April 15, 1994, art. 3.1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) ("To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary
measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanity or
phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations,
where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in
particular in paragraph 3."), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/15-sps.pdf (last visited July 27, 2003).
50. See Beef Hormones, supra note 51, para. 103 (explaining that "one purpose
of the SPS Agreement, as explicitly recognized in the preamble, is to promote the
use of international standards, guidelines and recommendations. To that end,
Article 3.1 imposes an obligation on all Members to base their sanitary measures
on international standards... ").
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predetermine the nature and extent of the legal effect of a given
provision, which must be read contextually. 5'
More recently, in Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High
Fructose Corn Syrup ("Corn Syrup"),52 the Appellate Body
considered the legal effect of DSU's Article 3.7, which provides that:
"[b]efore bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment as to
whether action under these procedures would be fruitful. ' 53 The
Appellate Body based its interpretation of the legal effect of Article
3.7 on European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas ("Bananas"),54 stating that:
a Member has broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a case against
another Member under the DSU. The language of Article XXIII: 1 of the
GATT 1994 and of Article 3.7 of the DSU suggests, furthermore, that a
Member is expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding whether any
such action would be "fruitful. '55 (emphasis added)
51. See id. para. 104 (arguing that treaty interpretation requires one to view
each specific provision in light of the general objective of the treaty); Cf Canada -
Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products,
Report of the Panel, WT/DSl 13/RW2, July 26, 2002 (holding that Canada violated
the Agreement on Agriculture by providing export subsidy in excess of its quantity
commitment levels specified in its Schedule for exports of cheese and "other dairy
products"), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/113RW2.doc (last visited July
16, 2003).
52. See Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup
(HFCS) from the United States, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United
States, WT/DS132/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Corn Syrup], available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/132ABRW.doc (last visited
July 16, 2003).
53. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, April 15, 1994, art. 3.7, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1153, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement
Understanding].
54. See Bananas, supra note 39, para. 132 (noting legal interest as a
prerequisite for requesting a panel).
55. See Corn Syrup, supra note 52, para. 73 (quoting paragraph 135 of the
Bananas decision).
2003] 1345
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
The Appellate Body also noted that the "largely self-regulating"
nature of the requirement in the first sentence of Article 3.7 meant
that panels and the Appellate Body should presume that members
submit panel requests in good faith.56
As suggested by these precedents, an analysis of the legal effect of
the individual provisions of the Enabling Clause should consider the
nature of the Enabling Clause as a legal instrument, its status within
the GATT/WTO framework, and also the historical context in which
GSP emerged.57
WTO law has a tendency to regard waiver provisions as strict
conditions. Accordingly, members may only deviate from WTO
obligations to the extent that their conduct can be shown to strictly
adhere to the waiver. 8 If the Enabling Clause were a waiver, there
would have been a presumption that the "requirements," to which
India averts in its complaint, are strict conditions and subject to close
judicial scrutiny.5 9 Although usually called a waiver in general and
non-technical discussions of GSP, the Enabling Clause is not a
waiver within the special meaning of Article XXV of the GATT or
Article IX of the WTO Agreement. 6 Article XXV refers to waivers
56. See id. para. 74 (explaining why the panel was not obliged to consider the
issue on its own motion).
57. See Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 31 (providing the rule of
general interpretation for treaties).
58. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on EC Complaint Concerning U.S.
Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products Applied
Under the 1955 Waiver and Under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff
Concessions, L/6631 - 37S/228 GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at para. 5.9 (Nov. 7,
1990) ("The panel took into account in its examination that waivers are granted
according to Article XXV:5 only in "exceptional circumstances", that they waive
obligations under the basic rules of the General Agreement and that their terms and
conditions consequently have to be interpreted narrowly."); see also Daniel
Marinberg, GA TT/WTO Waivers: "Exceptional Circumstances" as Applied to the
Lome Waiver, 19 B.U. INT'L. L. J. 129, 134 (2001) (describing the many hurdles
that states must overcome in order to be granted a waiver, followed by a
continuing review of the conditions for which the waiver was granted in the first
place).
59. See India Panel Request, supra note 10, para. 2 (referring to articles 2(a),
3(a), and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause).
60. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 164 (MIT Press 2d ed. 1997)
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of an obligation "imposed on a contracting party" in "exceptional
circumstances."'" The Enabling Clause fails to refer to any
exceptional circumstances, fails to name any particular contracting
party, and contains no waiver definition.62 It is also not a temporary
waiver, which would typically exist in the case of exceptional
circumstances63 which are required for Article XXV waivers.64 The
Enabling Clause allows for what has become a basic tenet of the
international economic legal order, namely the special and
differential treatment of developing countries." It modifies the
existing law of the GATT and numerous international declarations
and instruments such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD") and the United Nations Economic and
Social Council ("ECOSOC") have adopted it. Rather than an
exception to the GATT, the Enabling Clause is an integral part of the
international trade legal system.
For those reasons, it is inappropriate to apply the narrow reading
of the Lome Waiver in Bananas to the interpretation of the Enabling
Clause.66 Unlike the Lome Waiver at issue in Bananas, Paragraph 1
(describing how GATT Article XX "general exceptions" can allow departures
from MFN).
61. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XXV [hereinafter GATT].
62. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9 (discussing how the Enabling Clause is
devoid of these requirements).
63. See WTO Agreement art. IX(3) (limiting each waiver, regardless of the
termination date set, to one year of effectiveness); see also Marinberg, supra note
58, at 134 (describing additional provisions meant to keep waivers temporary).
64. See WTO Agreement Annex IA n. 7 (listing the waivers granted under
Article XXV of the GATT 1947 and still in force on the date of entry establishing
the Multilateral Trade Organization).
65. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 3; see also Aisha L. Joseph, The
Banana Split: Has the Stalemate Been Broken in the WTO Banana Dispute? The
Global Trade Community's "A-Peel"for Justice, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 744,
746-47 (2000) (remarking that although the system of preferential treatment
accorded to the developing countries contradicted the language of particular GATT
provisions, the principles behind the preferential treatment "complied with the
tenets of international economic development law").
66. See Bananas, supra note 39, para. 168 (holding that Members may waive
the compliance with the provisions of paragraph I of Article I in the GATT only
"to the extent necessary" to permit the European Communities to provide the
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of the Enabling Clause lacks language such as "to the extent
necessary." Thus, a developed country member of the WTO does not
have to prove that each aspect of its deviation from the strictures of
GATT Article I is necessary for purposes of granting differential and
more favorable treatment to developing countries. Instead, as long as
preferential treatment falls under one of the heads of Paragraph 2,
Article I simply does not apply at all-it is overridden.
The Enabling Clause is also different from Article XXIV of the
GATT, which provides an MFN exception for customs unions and
free trade areas.67 Article XXIV does not contain language that
renders GATT Article I inapplicable to measures taken in the
operation of customs unions and free trade areas; Article XXIV only
provides that Article I shall not prevent the formation of customs
unions and free trade areas.68 Article XXIV does not authorize the
operation of customs unions and free trade areas notwithstanding
Article I. Instead, unlike GSP, the Article I framework still applies in
customs unions and free trade areas, to the extent consistent with
their formation or existence. The Enabling Clause does not explicitly
provide for enforcement or policing of its provisions through dispute
settlement 69 because it is an integral part of the Covered Agreements
to which the DSU applies.
This approach to dispute settlement contrasts significantly with
that of the predecessor instrument to the Enabling Clause, the GSP
Decision of 1971.70 The GSP Decision contained detailed and
explicit language concerning the availability of dispute settlement.7'
"preferential treatment" that is "required" by the relevant provisions of the Lome
Convention).
67. See GATT, supra note 61, art. XXIV (allowing Members within unified
economic areas to implement measures that might normally violate their GSP
scheme).
68. See id., art. XXIV, para. 9.
69. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 9 (noting instead that Members
will meet collaboratively to review the operations of the provision).
70. See GSP Decision, supra note 8, para. (a) (providing a limited exception to
MFN in order to facilitate developed Contracting Parties granting GSP preferences
to assist developing nations).
7 1. See id. para. (e) (specifically stating that Members may bring disputes may
before the Contracting Parties).
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Such a distinction may derive from the fact that, unlike the Enabling
Clause, the GSP Decision of 1971 is, in legal structure, a waiver. The
operative provision of the Decision states: " . . . the provisions of
Article I shall be waived for a period of ten years to the extent
necessary... [to permit developed countries to provide to
developing countries generalized, non-discriminatory, non-reciprocal
preferential tariff treatment]"(emphasis added).72 Since the GSP
decision of 1971 is a waiver, it is not surprising that the provisions of
the waiver required a deviation from Article I and a strict scrutiny by
the Appellate Body.73
In India-Balance of Payments, the Appellate Body rejected
arguments that it should approach adjudication of the legal
provisions at issue due to concerns about "institutional balance. 74
The practice of dealing with such issues through avenues other than
dispute settlement (in this case a WTO committee on balance of
payments measures) did not incline the Appellate Body to a less
intrusive or less strict scrutiny of the defendant's measures. The
Appellate Body relied in part on an explicit affirmation in Uruguay
Round legal instruments concerning the role of dispute settlement in
the implementation of the rights and obligations in question.75
Similarly, a Uruguay Round text affirmed the availability of
dispute settlement in the case of "the failure of the Member to whom
a waiver was granted to observe the terms and conditions of the
72. Id. para. (a).
73. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 53, at 1226 (addressing
which issues dispute settlement may address).
74. See Balance of Payments, supra note 34, para. 105 (rejecting the
requirement of adjudicating legal provisions due to concerns about institutional
balance).
75. See Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1158 (1994);
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1161 (1994).
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waiver. 7 6 Again, the issue is not justiciability as such, but rather
whether the provisions of a waiver are "terms and conditions" that
the dispute settlement organs must interpret strictly.77 In contrast to
the case of waivers, the Doha instrument, which addresses the
Enabling Clause,78 fails to mention the availability of dispute
settlement to address violations of the Enabling Clause. It merely
reaffirms that preferences granted to developing countries under the
Enabling Clause "should be generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-
discriminatory."79 This formulation, especially the use of "should"
rather than stronger obligatory language, makes it clear that these
elements of the GSP are not legally binding. Not only does the
Decision not refer to the enforceability of "terms" or "conditions" of
the Enabling Clause in dispute settlement, but it does not require a
phase out or modification for non-conforming preferences within any
kind of time period.8"
Another consideration to keep in mind is that, where a legal
obligation is unclear, the international law principle of in dubio
mitius requires a treaty interpreter to adopt the reading that least
restricts the sovereignty of a signatory state. The Appellate Body in
Beef Hormones thus found that:
76. Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1163, para. 3(b)
(1994) (".. .the application of a measure consistent with the terms and conditions
of the waiver may invoke the provisions of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 as
elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding.").
77. See id. para. 3(a) (requiring Members to observe or comply with measures
explicitly set forth in a waiver).
78. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001) (reaffirming the preferences granted
in the Enabling Clause). Within the meaning of the Vienna Convention rules on
treaty interpretation, this instrument would be relevant as either a subsequent
agreement or subsequent practice of the Parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. XX.
79. WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 78, para. 12.2.
80. See id. (failing to address the enforceability of aspects of the Enabling
Clause and not requiring a phase out period).
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We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose upon
themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation
by mandating conformity or compliance with such standards, guidelines
and recommendations. To sustain such an assumption and to warrant such
a far-reaching interpretation, treaty language far more specific and
compelling.., would be necessary.
81
One final general consideration is the role of UNCTAD in the
implementation of the GSP.81 A Special Committee within UNCTAD
annually reviews the implementation of the GSP and occasionally
conducts in-depth studies. 3 By the time of the Enabling Clause
negotiations, this Committee had issued numerous detailed reports
and recommendations on the functioning of the GSP. These reports,
various resolutions, and other UNCTAD instruments suggest that
UNCTAD conceived itself as having a lead role in the oversight of
the GSP, which may explain the lack of more detailed institutional
arrangements in the text of the Enabling Clause.
B. INDIA'S CLAIM THAT EU PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT IS
CONTRARY TO PARAGRAPH 2(A)
As noted above, in order for the override of GATT Article I to
apply, Paragraph 2(a) states that preferential tariff treatment for
developing countries must be "in accordance" with the GSP,84 as
"described" in the 1971 GSP decision. 5 If we turn to the 1971
decision, it is the Preamble of the 1971 Decision that contains the
description of the preferential tariff treatment under the rubric of
GSP.86 That description is as follows: "a mutually acceptable system
of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences
81. Beef Hormones, supra note 48, para. 165.
82. See Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 31.
83. See U.N. TDBOR, Decision 75, Generalised System of Preferences, 4th
Special Sess., 267th mtg. at Annex I, U.N. Doc. TD/B/330 (1970) [hereinafter
Trade and Development Board Resolution 75].
84. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 2(a) (requiring countries to keep
preferential treatment within the bounds of the GSP).
85. See GSP Decision, supra note 8, para. (a) (indicating the sort of preferential
treatment reserved for developing countries).
86. See id. (describing preferential tariff treatment under the rubric of GSP).
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beneficial to the developing countries in order to increase the export
earnings, to promote the industrialization, and to accelerate the rates
of economic growth of these countries .... "87
It is unclear what the Enabling Clause means by saying that
"preferential treatment" must be in accordance with this
description.88 Does the requirement apply to a Member's system of
trade preferences for developing countries as a whole? Or must every
individual element in a Member's system of trade preferences fully
or perfectly realize this description? The Preamble refers to
"mutually acceptable arrangements... drawn up in the UNCTAD
concerning the establishment of generalized, non-discriminatory,
non-reciprocal preferential tariff treatment in the markets of
developed countries for the products originating in developing
countries."(emphasis added)89 It is clear from the relevant UNCTAD
instruments, which form part of the "context" for the interpretation
of the Enabling Clause within the meaning of Vienna Convention
Article 31, that the notion of a generalized, non-discriminatory, and
non-reciprocal system of preferences refers to an objective to
progressively realize such a systems on the basis of arrangements
that are mutually acceptable to both developed and developing
countries.90
From the outset, developed countries were not willing to provide
preferential treatment that applied to all countries and all products.
For example, if one viewed the notion of preferences having to be
"generalized" and "non-discriminatory" as requiring that every
element of a Member's scheme of preferences fully conform to that
description in order to take advantage of waiver treatment under the
1971 Decision or the override of the Enabling Clause, then the GSP
would never have gotten off the ground. This reading would have
prevented developed countries from offering preferences on terms
87. Id. at pmbl.
88. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 2(a) (referring to the establishment
of a system of preferences for developing countries).
89. GSP Decision, supra note 8, at pmbl.
90. See, e.g., Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 9 (requiring collaboration
between contracting parties in establishing provisions designed to meet the needs
of developing countries)
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that were acceptable to them. In this respect, the language "mutually
acceptable" informs and conditions the entire description of the
generalized system of preferences in the Preamble to the 1971 GSP
Decision. 91 Such a description cannot impose conditions or
limitations on the manner in which GSP treatment is granted or
withdrawn unless they are "mutually acceptable" to both developed
and developing countries. 92
The aspirational nature of the norm that preferences be
generalized, non-discriminatory, and non-reciprocal was reflected as
recently as the Doha Decision on Implementation in 2001. The Doha
Decision "re-affirmed" that preferences granted under the Enabling
Clause "should" have these characteristics, but without any defined
timetable for the achievement of this goal, or any clear guidelines as
to the extent of its development at a given future point in time.93 The
relevant language in the Declaration at UNCTAD IX, in 1980, states
that "[t]here is concern among the beneficiaries that the enlargement
of the scope of the GSP by linking eligibility to non-trade
considerations may detract value from its original principles, namely
non-discrimination, universality, burden sharing and non-
reciprocity."94 This language is obviously a far cry from a
condemnation of such linkage as placing the preferences in question
outside the ambit of the relevant description of the GSP, i.e. as a
mutually acceptable generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-
discriminatory system of preferences. In addition, the reference to
"beneficiaries" in this declaration is a reminder that the entire
description of GSP is informed by the notion that the system is to be
"mutually acceptable" to both developed and developing countries.
Developed countries, however, have never accepted that they be able
to operate a GSP scheme, unless the scheme is completely
unconditional and non-selective.
91. See GSP Decision, supra note 8, at pmbl.
92. See id.
93. See WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 78, para. 12 (outlining the
framework for implementation of the preferences system).
94. UNCTAD, Midrand Declaration and a Partnership for Growth and
Development, 9th Sess., para. 27, U.N. Doc. TD/377 (May 11, 1996) (providing
the discussion on the new GSP scheme), available at
http://r0.unctad.org/en/special/u9toc377.htm (last visited July 16, 2003).
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Just prior to the coming into force of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, and the incorporation of the Enabling Clause into the
GATT 1994, the 1994 Joint Declaration of the European Union and
ASEAN shows that concerns about labor conditionality in the
European Communities' new GSP scheme were not understood to
involve a claim of WTO illegality.95 The language of the Declaration
is as follows:
The Ministers recognized that the General System of Preferences (GSP)
has contributed to the growth in exports from ASEAN to the EU. More
than one third of ASEAN's exports to the EU enjoy tariff concessions
under the GSP. The Ministers noted that the EU envisages a revision and
updating of the GSP for the next decade. In this context, the Ministers
recognized that the Cumulative Rules of Origin (CRO) provision has
contributed to ASEAN's regional integration and would further assist
ASEAN in achieving its objectives of an ASEAN Free Trade Area. The
ASEAN Ministers stressed their concerns about certain elements such as
'Social Incentives' in the Commission proposals on the review of the
GSP.
96
It is clear that although the ASEAN Ministers had "concerns" about
social incentives, these concerns did not lead to the slightest
questioning of the legality of the EC GSP scheme under the GATT
Enabling Clause. Moreover, it is clear that there was no agreement
between the European Union and the ASEAN Ministers that the
WTO rules, in any legal sense, disciplined such incentives.
In sum, the subsequent practice of the Parties within the meaning
of Vienna Convention Article 31 strongly points to an interpretation
of the notion of a "non-discriminatory" and "non-reciprocal" system
of preferences as aspirational. Despite persistent concern by
developing countries about conditionality and selectivity in GSP
schemes over a period of almost thirty years, no legal instrument has
ever been promulgated that elevates the elements of non-
discrimination or non-reciprocity to a legal condition precedent for
the granting of preferences that would otherwise be inconsistent with
95. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Joint Declaration
The Eleventh ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting paras. 8-10 (Sept. 23, 1994)
available at http://www.aseansec.org/5642.htm (last visited July 16, 2003).
96. Id. para. 10.
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Article I. The policy basis for continuing to treat these elements as, at
most, "basic principles," which developed countries are exhorted to
reflect in their GSP schemes, is expressed in the judgment of a 1998
Report to ECOSOC by the Secretariats of UNCTAD and the WTO:97
"[despite, inter alia, selectivity and conditionality in some GSP
schemes] the GSP remains a valuable tool for promoting developing-
country exports." 98
When balanced against various "improvements" in GSP treatment,
including "a substantial extension of product coverage for all GSP
recipients," 99 the remaining or new elements of selectivity and
conditionality did not justify moving to a stricter approach, enforcing
the elements of non-discrimination and non-reciprocity as legal
conditions precedent. Leaving aside whether it could ever be part of
"mutually acceptable" GSP arrangements, such a stricter approach
might lead to waning enthusiasm on the part of developed countries
to further extend and improve their GSP schemes to the benefit of
developing countries. Thus, the repeated reaffirmations of non-
discrimination and non-reciprocity as principles of the GSP, up to
and including the Doha Decision on Implementation, have never
been accompanied by requirements that aspects of WTO Members'
GSP schemes that detract from those principles be removed or
modified within a definite period of time, or completely. °10
This is consistent with the approach of the adopted GATT panel in
Rubber Footwear, which determined whether preferences fall within
paragraph 2(a).'0 ' The panel noted that, "the GSP programme of the
United States, both in its nature and its design, accords duty-free
97. See U.N. ESCOR, Developments Since the Uruguay Round, Implications,
Opportunities and Challenges, in Particular for the Developing Countries and the
Least Developed among Them, in the Context of Globalization and Liberalization,
U.N. Doc. E/1998/55 (1998).
98. Id. paras. 39-40.
99. Id. para. 39.
100. Contra Balance of Payments, supra note 34, para. 1 (reaffirming the
commitment "to announce publicly, as soon as possible, time-schedules for the
removal of restrictive import measures taken for balance-of-payments purposes").
101. See Rubber Footwear, supra note 40, para. 6.15 (consideringthe extent to
which paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause allows for preferential tariff treatment
for developing countries).
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status to only certain products originating in only certain developing
countries."'' 2 The panel further noted that this entailed both a tariff
and a non-tariff advantage to the selected beneficiaries.0 3 The panel
made it very clear that the Article I override in the Enabling Clause
excluded selective duty-free treatment under the U.S. GSP scheme,
only to the extent that such duty free treatment results in the
conferral of an additional, non-tariff preference on the beneficiary.
Thus, while the Enabling Clause 2(a) protects tariff preferences that
are provided on a selective basis, both in respect of products and
countries, non-tariff preferences receive no similar protection. 10 4 The
wisdom of this interpretive approach is strongly confirmed if we
consider the jurisprudential challenge for the dispute settlement
organs if, under Paragraph 2(a), non-discrimination or non-
reciprocity were considered to be legal conditions that determined
whether the GATT Article I override was applicable to a given case
of preferential treatment.
It is one thing for political and diplomatic bodies and actors to
make general assertions that selectivity and conditionality of
preferences are inconsistent with, or detract from, the spirit or
principle of non-discrimination or non-reciprocity. It is quite another
matter, however, for a judicial body to examine the individual
features of a preference scheme in order to determine whether each
of them meets a legal condition of non-discrimination. In the
GATT/WTO legal framework, non-discrimination is a complex and
varied concept. One need only contrast the notion of discrimination
in Article I of the GATT, which involves a comparison of the
treatment of like products with the concept in the chapeau of Article
XX, which entails a comparison of the treatment of countries "where
the same conditions prevail."'0 5
102. Id. para. 6.14.
103. See id. (expressing a non-tariff benefit as "the automatic backdating of
countervailing duty revocation orders").
104. See id. para. 6.15 (noting the limitations placed on preferential treatment to
"tariff preferences only").
105. See European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12,
2001) [hereinafter Asbestos], available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.asp?searchmode=simple (last visited July 18,
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To begin an analysis of whether the European Commission's
preferential treatment, based on labor and environmental
conditionality, violated a purported legal condition of non-
discrimination in the Enabling Clause, the panel and the Appellate
Body would have to cut from whole cloth as it were an appropriate
juridical concept of non-discrimination. Since the issue here is
whether an override to Article I applies, the dispute settlement
organs could not simply appropriate the MFN concept of non-
discrimination, without the risk of rendering the Enabling Clause, in
important respects, inutile.
In the case of special preferences based upon labor conditionality,
the core labor standards in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work form the basis for the conditions in
question.106 All ILO Members are committed to these standards, as
indeed are all WTO Members, indirectly, through the Singapore
Declaration. 07 Therefore, the Commission similarly regards all
developing countries with respect to the conditions for special
preferential treatment. The question then arises as to whether the
condition therefore results in discrimination.
A different kind of issue about the concept and meaning of non-
discrimination would arise with respect to the preferences with
environmental conditionality. These preferences apply only to
products from certain forests, where the country of origin
"effectively applies national legislation incorporating the substance
of internationally acknowledged standards and guidelines concerning
2003). As discussed below, however, there is one relatively uncontroversial
meaning to non-discrimination as a characteristic of GSP schemes-preferential
schemes restricted permanently to an exclusive regional grouping of countries do
not fall within the GSP rubric. However, this meaning is sufficient to allow the
WTO adjudicator to play its proper role under Enabling Clause Paragraph 2(a),
namely assuring that overall the scheme in question falls within the general GSP
rubric. But it would be an entirely different matter, for the adjudicator to be called
upon to evaluate all the individual distinctions and differentiations drawn within a
GSP scheme against "non-discrimination" as a legal condition, which is what India
is calling for.
106. See ILO Declaration, supra note 18 and accompanying text (providing
internationally agreed upon labor standards).
107. See Brunei Darusslam - Indonesia -Malaysia - Philippines - Singapore -
Thailand: Singapore Declaration of 1992, Jan. 28, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 498 (1992).
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sustainable management of forests."' °8 What would happen if a
potential recipient country were to argue that, despite the absence of
national legislation, products from its tropical forests do not create
environmental externalities of the kind addressed by internationally
acknowledged standards and guidelines? It is not obvious that the EC
Regulation prohibits the European Commission from granting
preferences where there is such equivalence. 109 Thus, one could
interpret the EC Regulation as not mandating discrimination of the
kind based on country of origin. Neither the Enabling Clause nor the
GSP Decision of 1971, to which the Clause refers, provide the
dispute settlement organs of the WTO with a textual anchor to
articulate an appropriate concept of discrimination. " 0
Here, one must recall that the 1971 GSP Decision describes GSP
as a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal, and
non-discriminatory preferences."' Developed countries have never
accepted the notion of non-discrimination invoked by those
developing countries claiming that preferences conditioned on
environmental and labor rights performance are discriminatory.
108. Council Regulation 2501/01, supra note 15, art. 21.2.
109. See id., para. 7 ("Preferences should be differentiated according to the
sensitivity of products. It would be sufficient to differentiate between two product
categories, non-sensitive and sensitive products.").
110. Although the drug preferences are not the focus of the paper, this is, if
anything, even more true for them. One could argue that developing countries with
a drug enforcement challenge are different from, and have different development
needs than, those without such a challenge. On the other hand, is it truly non-
discriminatory for the European Union to offer special, additional preferences to
respond to those countries' special challenges with respect to drugs, and not to
other challenges faced by other developing countries that equally might be
addressed through greater access to export markets, such as the need for foreign
currency to buy AIDS medications, in the case of those developing countries
devastated by AIDS? Additional preferences might partially alleviate many special
circumstances in individual developing countries, and from this perspective, the
drug criterion appears arbitrarily selective, and thus arguably non-objective and
discriminatory. It all depends on the comparator, or the grounds on which it is
permissible to distinguish the situations or conduct of different developing
countries. The Enabling Clause appears to offer no explicit indication of what the
permissible or impermissible grounds are, but as the example just discussed
indicates, the notion of development needs, which admittedly does exist in the
Enabling Clause itself, is too vague to serve as an adequate comparator.
11. See GSP Decision, supra note 8, at pmbl.
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Instead, developed countries have maintained that such
conditionality is non-discriminatory because all developing countries
are judged equally against the same neutral or objective criteria." 12
If dispute settlement organs were to regard each element of a
Member's GSP scheme as reviewable against legal norms of non-
discrimination and non-reciprocity, the dispute settlement organs
would be throwing the operation of the GSP as it now stands into
profound uncertainty." 3 All GSP schemes contain elements of
selectivity and conditionality that a panel or the Appellate Body
could view as discriminatory depending on one's conception of
discrimination. From the perspective of developing countries, this
uncertainty would make the preferences in question even more
precarious and uncertain in the short term, and erode the viability of
any "mutually acceptable" systems of preferences in the long term." 4
Of course, these concerns could not override specific treaty text,
explicitly directing the dispute settlement organs to adjudicate non-
discrimination as a legal condition of the Enabling Clause."5 In the
absence of explicit language, however, these concerns deserve to be
weighed in determining whether such a direction should be
inferred. 16
112. See Lorand Bartels, Article XX of GATT and the Problem of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of
Human Rights, 36(2) J. WORLD TRADE 353, 358-65 (2002).
113. See Robert Hudec, The Structure of South-South Trade Preferences in the
1988 GSTP Agreement: Learning to Say MFMFN in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND
THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 210, 223-228 (John Whalley, ed., Macmillan 1989)
(assessing the difficulties of drawing a line between permissible and impermissible
differential treatment within a preferential, and thus inherently discriminatory
scheme).
114. See id. at 228 (questioning the participants reasoning in granting or
prohibiting certain types of benefits).
115. See Turkey - Textiles, supra note 34, paras. 58-60 and (noting the
Appellate Body's reluctance to interpret that WTO legal instruments as falling
outside the adjudicative jurisdiction of dispute settlement organs).
116. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 2 (maintaining that paragraph 2(d)
of the Enabling Clause explicitly allows additional margins of preferences for
least-developed countries). One might also interpret that the Enabling Clause
implicitly prohibits grants of additional margins of preferences to any select group
of countries within a GSP scheme except on grounds that they are "least
developed". In this sense, one could argue that there is one permitted comparator
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The above analysis obviously points to the conclusion that, as a
general matter, the Enabling Clause's reference to a non-
discriminatory and non-reciprocal system of preferences is of an
aspirational nature and does not create enforceable conditions.
However, just as subsequent practice sustains this conclusion as a
general matter, subsequent practice also suggests that some
discriminatory preferential arrangements are understood to fall
outside the ambit of the Enabling Clause, by virtue of their overall
character."'7
In Rubber Footwear, the panel held that to benefit from the MFN
override in the Enabling Clause, preferential treatment must fall into
one of the categories in Paragraph 2.118 The WTO adjudicator must
therefore consider whether, overall or generally, the preferential
treatment at issue is in "accordance" with the description imported
from the 1971 GSP Decision. Preference schemes designed to benefit
only countries within a particular region or grouping are, as a general
matter, outside the notion of a GSP. This is the extent to which there
is a discemable mutually acceptable meaning to the idea of non-
discrimination in relation to GSP. Since these schemes are in
principle limited to an exclusive group of developing countries, they
are simply outside the ambit of 2(a) altogether.
C. PARAGRAPH 3(A) OF THE ENABLING CLAUSE
Paragraph 3(a) of the Enabling Clause states that "[a]ny
differential and more favourable treatment provided under this
clause.., shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of
developing countries and not to raise barriers to or create undue
difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties .... ,"9 '9 This
for differential treatment within GSP schemes; whether or not a country is "least
developed," with all other comparators prohibited. But given the enormous
consequences described above in the text, deriving it would seem judicial
overreaching to derive a prohibition on other distinctions within GSP schemes by
implication alone of based on what paragraph 2(d) permits.
117. See Bananas, supra note 39, paras. 167-68
118. See Rubber Footwear, supra note 40, paras. 6.14-6.15 (explaining that the
U.S. measure fell outside of Paragraph 2(a) by affording a non-tariff advantage ).
119. See Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 3 (setting forth the limitations on
EU preferences).
1360 [18:1333
BACK TO THE COURTAFTER SHRIMP/TURTLE
language, unlike that in Paragraph 2(a), appears to establish
something like a legal condition for the operation of the MFN
override in the Enabling Clause. Paragraph 3 makes stipulations that
apply to "[a]ny differential and more favorable treatment
provided .... -120 Thus, all particular instances or aspects of
preferential treatment must be consistent with the strictures of
Paragraph 3(a). These provisions, even if conditions of a sort, may be
largely self-policing' 2' or be more appropriately policed by
institutions other than the dispute settlement organs of the WTO. The
question of whether a given preference scheme is designed to
facilitate and promote the trade or development questions seems to
be an economic and policy question.
With respect to the second clause of Paragraph 3(a), India would
appear to be ill situated to complain about the negative trade effects
that GSP has on developed countries. Since the incorporation of the
Enabling Clause in the 1994 GATT, the first clause of Paragraph
3(a), which requires that preferences be "designed to facilitate and
promote the trade of developing countries,"' 12 must now be read in
light of the Preamble to the WTO Agreement. The Preamble to the
WTO Agreement deals with the objectives of facilitating and
promoting developing country trade in light of the general purposes
of the WTO.123 These purposes include:
[r]aising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income, and.., expanding... trade in
goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with ... [the] respective needs
and concerns [of WTO Members] at different levels of economic
development. 1
24
120. Id.
121. See Corn Syrup, supra note 52, paras. 72-74 (noting that GATT Members
exercise broad discretion in the decision of whether or not to bring a case against
another member would be fruitful).
122. Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 3.
123. See id. para. 1 (detailing the values of the founding parties of the WTO).
124. Id.
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The question remains as to whether the EU's labor preferences
would facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries when
the Preamble to the WTO Agreement serves to explain the context of
the Enabling Clause. The EU's preferences essentially provide lower
tariff rates to imports from developing countries that certify
compliance with core labor standards. If the EU's preferences were
not designed to facilitate and promote trade, it is difficult to see how
the preferences could induce developing countries to comply with
core labor standards because such countries would have little reason
to participate in the GSP scheme. It is possible, however, that these
principles may also enable the kind of growth and income-enhancing
effects of liberal trade described in the Preamble to the WTO
Agreement.'25 Studies by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") and independent academic
economists suggest a positive correlation between compliance with
core labor standards and higher levels of economic growth and
development. 12 6
With respect to the EU's environmental preferences, in addition to
the obvious trade promotion effect of a reduced level of tariff, the
environmental conditionality in these preferences may contribute to
increased trade consistent with sustainable development,'27 as stated
in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement. To the extent that adherence
to international guidelines on sustainable forest management results,
in better internalization of environmental externalities, it will
125. See id. (describing the effects of liberal trade).
126. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF
CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 104-105 (OECD 1996)
(finding that the economic gains of short term low core standards are outweighed
in the long term and that all countries could strengthen their economic performance
by adhering to core standards); PETER MORICI & EVAN SCHULTZ, LABOR
STANDARDS IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 7-11 (Econ. Strategy Inst. 2001)
(explaining that empirical findings suggest that enforcement of the four core labor
standards would promote trade).
127. See WTO Agreement I (contending that trade relations should allow "for
the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development").
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contribute to "optimal use of the world's resources,"' t2 and more
efficient trade based upon the relative environmental costs of
different sources of tropical timber.'29 Moreover, the conditionality in
the EC scheme requires only the implementation and enforcement of
the "substance" of such guidelines. The European Commission,
therefore, has the discretion to decide that a developing country
qualifies for the special preferences even if that country, for example,
decides not to incorporate aspects of the guidelines that appear to be
inappropriate to its needs. India's position in Shrimp/Turtle is not
that of a developing country that has applied for the special
preferences, but is instead the position of a developing country that
the European Union has refused to grant preferences because its
domestic legislation or the application of that legislation does not
ensure the "substance" of international standards and guidelines.
Given the experience of the Commission administration with special
preferences to date, a claim that the conditionality in question is not
sufficiently accommodating or supportive of the different needs of
different developing countries would clearly be unripe.
D. PARAGRAPH 3(c) OF THE ENABLING CLAUSE
Paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause states that preferences
provided under the Enabling Clause shall "be designed and, if
necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development,
financial and trade needs of developing countries."' 3 ° With respect to
labor conditionality, both the ILO's developing country and
developed country membership have declared the labor rights at
issue to be "fundamental". Similarly, with respect to environmental
conditionality, the internationally acknowledged standards and
guidelines to which the EC scheme is indexed are essentially those
developed in the International Tropical Timber Organization
128. See id. (recognizing that trade relations should endeavor to make optimal
use of the world's resources).
129. See ITTO Guidelines, supra note 19, at 7 (noting that proper conversion
and management of forests may "play an important role in the production of
timber, wood, and non-wood forest products for local and national use and
international trade").
130. Enabling Clause, supra note 9, para. 3(c).
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("ITTO"), an entity where both developing country producers and
predominately-developed country consumers have equal voting
rights and full membership.' 3' The WTO adjudicator is not
institutionally competent to make its own judgments about whether
the design of the preferences in question responds positively to the
development and related needs of developing countries. Thus,
assuming that Paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause is not entirely
self-policing, the full and active involvement of developing countries
in the elaboration of the standards in question should provide the
appropriate assurance that the EC scheme is consistent with
paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause. 132
Moreover, as noted with respect to Paragraph 3(a), the
conditionality in the EC scheme entails only that the recipient of the
special preferences implement and enforce "the substance" of the
international standards and guidelines in question. 33 On its face, this
allows the Commission to apply the special preference conditionality
to permit recipients to maintain and adopt forest management
131. See U.N.C.T.A.D., International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan. 10,
1994, art. 5, U.N. Doc. TD/TIMBER.2/Misc.7/GE.94-50830, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1014 (describing the terms of membership under the agreement, including
voting rights).
132. One should not understand this as an "estoppel" argument against the
possibility of developing countries complaining about the standards in question
being a basis for trade conditionality. After all, not all the instruments in question
are binding, and not all developing countries consent to these instruments being
enforced or applied through trade conditionality. It is only an argument that the
standards themselves could not easily be considered to be at odds with paragraph
3(c). As I go on to suggest, the way that trade conditionality is applied based on
such standards may indeed raise separate issues under 3(c). So far, however, as is
noted in the text to follow, there does not seem to be any evidence that the
application of the conditionality in the EC scheme has taken place in a manner
contrary to the norm in 3(c). Of course, if India is able to muster such evidence it
would have to be taken seriously, and the claim would be in no way undermined
by the fact that the standards themselves represent broad agreement between
developed and developing countries.
133. See EC GSP Scheme, supra note 15, art. 21 (giving the option of granting
special incentives to countries that incorporate the "substance" of international
agreement, such as the sustainable management of tropical forests).
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legislation and regulation that "respond positively to their
development, financial and trade needs."'
' 34
II. THE CONSISTENCY OF EU LABOR AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES WITH GATT
ARTICLE I
Article 1:1 of the GATT requires that, "any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
parties."'35 The extra margin of preference accorded under the EC
scheme to products from developing countries that meet the relevant
labor and environmental criteria is an advantage or favor with respect
to customs duties. Since only the context of the EC's GSP scheme
authorizes the preferential treatment in question, such treatment is
simply unavailable to WTO members who are not developing
countries, even if they happen to be fully compliant with the criteria
in question. Thus, this preferential treatment violates Article I.
At the same time, the EC scheme does not exclude India from
such preferential treatment. The EU regulation merely authorizes the
European Commission to grant an additional margin of preference to
developing countries that request it and meet certain non-country-
specific criteria. In the case of India, however, while the Commission
has not granted India the special preferential treatment in question,
this is because India apparently never requested such treatment.
Long-established GATT doctrine allows legislation itself, as
opposed to actions taken pursuant to legislation, to be challenged
only if the legislation actually mandates violation of WTO rules.'36
134. Id. para. 3(c) (stating that differential treatment positively enhance
development, economics, and trade).
135. GATT, supra note 61, art. 1:1.
136. See GATT, supra note 61, art. XXIII (allowing Members to challenge the
legislation of another Member if that legislation nullified and impaired rights
arising under the GATT); see also Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note
53, art. 3 (requiring an impairment of WTO benefits prior to initiation of dispute
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Where legislation mere grants a discretion that may or may not be
used in such a manner to violate WTO rules, a complainant must
base its case on an actual instance where the application of the law-
i.e. the exercise of the discretion-violates WTO rules. In addition,
one WTO panel decision has suggested that it may sometimes be
possible to challenge discretionary legislation, where the nature of
the discretion is such as to threaten the security of specific rights
under the WTO Agreements and would deprive a member the normal
enjoyment of those rights.'37 This does not apply here, however, as
India could eliminate any uncertainty about India's rights by
applying to the European Union, which would decide whether to
extend the extra preferential treatment to India.
However, there are some developing countries that have applied
for labor and environmental incentives under the EC scheme, and the
question is whether this is sufficient for India's claim, even if India
itself cannot argue that the EC scheme is "mandatory" in relation to
India. In Havana Club, the Appellate Body found that the United
States had violated the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property's ("TRIPs") national treatment obligation by treating Cuban
nationals more favorably than U.S. nationals. 38  MFN is a
foundational norm of the multilateral trading system'39 and India has
a persuasive case that the EU special preferential treatment violates
Article I of the GATT.
settlement proceedings, which however is normally to be assumed when a treaty
provision is violated).
137. See United States- Sections 301-3 10 of The Trade Act of 1974, Report of
the Panel, WT/DS152/R, paras. 7.72-7.94 (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter S. 301
Case] available at, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu_e/wtds152r.doc
(last visited June 21, 2003).
138. See United States--Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS176/AB/R para. 281 (Jan. 2. 2002)
[hereinafter Havana Club] (concluding that the United States discriminatorily
distinguished between Cuban and U.S. nationals in possession of trademarks used
in connection with a business confiscated in Cuba), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/distabe.htm (last visited June 21,
2003).
139. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Nature of WTO Obligations § I(A)4 (2002)
(addressing whether, and which, WTO obligations are erga omnes partes),
available at, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/020101.html (last
visited June 21, 2003).
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III. ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT
Shrimp/Turtle determined that that Article XX could justify
measures that condition market access on the policies adopted by the
exporting WTO Member. 140 Thus, even though the EU special
preferential treatment violates Article I of the GATT, it may
nevertheless be justified under GATT Article XX. In such a case, the
European Union would not need to depend on the Enabling Clause to
maintain its special preferential treatment. Labor rights and
environmental conditionality raise rather different sets of issues with
respect to Article XX justification, and thus need separate
consideration.
A. LABOR RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY
The first step in considering an Article XX justification is to
determine whether the defending member's measures fall into any of
the individual provisions of Article XX.' 4' There are three exceptions
under Article XX that may apply to measures concerned with the
enforcement of labor rights: Article XX(a) refers to measures that are
necessary to protect public morals, Article XX(b) refers to measures
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and
Article XX(e) refers to measures related to products of prison labor.
1. Article XX(a) "Public Morals"
Neither the GATT nor the WTO has had the opportunity to
adjudicate the meaning and scope of "public morals. ' 1 42 Numerous
140. See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, para. 121 (1998) (asserting that
importing countries commonly require that exporting countries comply with
various policies, and that to assume all such interactions are unjustified under
Article XX invalidates the exceptions).
141. See id. paras. 99-113 (concluding that the initial threshold question for an
Article XX analysis is whether a measure falls under one of the particular
exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j) of the Article); see also Asbestos, supra note
105, paras. 155-57 (examining first whether the use of certain products fell within
the scope of Article XX(b)).
142. See C.T. FEDDERSEN, Der Ordre Public in der WTO: Auslegung und
Bedeutung des Art. XX lit. a) GATT im RAHMEN DER WTO-STREITBEILEGUNG
(Duncker &Humblot eds. 2002) (examining Article XX(a) in depth).
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scholars, including myself, have argued that internationally
recognized human rights articulate elements of international public
morality and come within the ordinary meaning of "public
morals."'43 In the Singapore Declaration, WTO Members renewed
their commitment to internationally recognized core labor standards,
and to the role of the ILO in articulating these standards. In turn, the
ILO has declared these core labor standards to be "Fundamental
Principles and Rights." Thus, human rights and labor standards
would help interpret the content of public morality under Article
XX(a). In the modern world, the very idea of public morality has
become inseparable from the concern for human personhood,
dignity, and capacity reflected in fundamental rights. 144 A conception
of public morals or morality that excluded notions of fundamental
rights would simply be contrary to the ordinary contemporary
meaning of the concept. 45
143. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of
Worker's Rights, 3 J. SMALL&EMERGING Bus. L, 131, 142-45 (1999) (offering the
argument that human rights are a core element of modem public morality and that
Article XX(a) should evolve with the modem disapproval of detrimental labor
practices) ; Steve Chamovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J.
INT'L L. 689, 745-46 (1998) (reviewing the extended history of trade exceptions
for moral and humanitarian purposes and the growing link between morality and
economic policy in an interdependent global community); Gabrielle Marceau,
WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 753, 790-91
((2002) stating that panels are able to determine if a measure is necessary to protect
public morals by relying on a members participation in human rights treaties).
144. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. (proclaiming the United Nation's goal of
reaffirming "faith in fundamental human rights, the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women. . ").
145. See Howse, supra note 143, at 142 (observing that t the meaning of "public
morals" could be limited to reflect the ordinary meaning of the expression at the
time the GATT 1947 came into effect). But see Morceau, supra note 143, at 784
(citing that interpretations of Article XX(a) should evolve based on the
endorsement of the Appellate Body of a dynamic interpretation of the meaning of
"exhaustible natural resources" in'Article XX(g) of the GATT in Shrimp/Turtle).
Admittedly, in Shrimp/Turtle the Appellate Body related its dynamic interpretation
to the mention of "sustainable development" in the Preamble of the WTO
Agreement. Id. However, in the case of Article XX(a) it simply defies common
sense to interpret the provision as allowing governments to respond only to moral
imperatives that existed over fifty years ago: responsible and representative
governments clearly have to be accountable to the values and interests of the
citizens of today-and tomorrow-not those of yesteryear. See Howse, supra note
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The text of Article XX(a) contains no territorial limitation on a
member's objective in protecting public morals. 14 6 The very
existence of international human rights, international labor rights
law, and the institutions developed to deal with these areas suggest
that the international community accepts that a state's legitimate
concern about the rporality of the treatment of individuals is not
limited to its own nationals (denial of justice, for instance). The
question of whether there are territorial limitations to the "public
morals" in Article XX(a) is sometimes confused with whether a
country could use a provision, such as Article XX(a), to justify
actions that violate general norms of public international law
concerning extraterritorial regulation. In Lotus, the International
Court of Justice defined the default rule in international law with
respect to extraterritorial regulation, stating that
[flar from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that
States may not extend the application of their laws and the
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property, and acts
outside their territory, [international law] leaves them in this
respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules. 47
Many such prohibitive rules have arisen with respect to particular
subject matter in individual treaties and conventions; however,
attempts to create a more restrictive general or default rule
143, at 166 (noting that in reaffirming their commitment to observance of core
labor standards in the Singapore Declaration, as well as the role of the ILO, the
Membership have now explicitly acknowledged the importance and legitimacy of
the protection of fundamental labor standards as a goal of national and
international policy); see also Feddersen, supra note 142, at 301 ("[d]ie textuelle
Auslegung der Vorschrift des Art. XX lit. a GATT erweist, dass es sich bei dem
Begriff der pubic morals um einen Relationbegriff handelt, der auch einer
dynamischen Entwicklung zugaenglich ist.").
146. See Shrimp/Turtle 1, supra note 1, para. 133 (explaining that the panel
refrained from addressing whether jurisdiction is implied by Article XX(g) because
the migratory nature of turtles to U.S. waters limited the panel's holding to the
specifics of the case).
147. See S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7), at
19 (holding that jurisdiction is not based on international title over territory, but
rather whether it conflicts with a recognized principle or prohibition of
international law).
2003] 1369
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction 48 have not succeeded in
modifying the default rule from Lotus. 149
The controversies in this area of public international law are
irrelevant to the case of EU preferential treatment based on
environmental and labor conditionality. The EU regulation purports
only to provide the Commission with powers to make a
determination of whether certain products can enter the European
Union at particular rates of duty.'50 It does not purport to regulate
conduct outside of the EU or give the Commission jurisdiction over
any persons, property, or transactions outside the European Union. If
a developing country is determined not to comply with the
conditionality in question, the only legal effect is a change in the rate
of duty at which the European Union will admit its products. 5'
Neither the government, nor the nationals, nor the property and
territory of that country are subject to any legal penalty or sanction,
or other form of control.
However, the WTO 1996 Singapore Declaration 5 2 does appear to
establish some kind of limit to the sort of trade measures that WTO
Members deem consistent with the WTO legal framework. The
Declaration states: "We reject the use of labour standards for
protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of
countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no
148. See S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk)., 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10 (Sept. 7)
(recognizing the prohibitive rule that a state may not exercise power "in" the
territory of another state, for example attempting to arrest, try or punish foreign
nationals on their own territory).
149. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14,
(June 27), at 125-26 (holding that there is no general or customary rule of
international law that prohibits as such the use of economic pressure such as trade
sanctions).
150. See EC GSP Scheme, supra note 15, art. 3 (granting the Commission the
power to determine which products benefit from lower duties).
151. See generally id.
152. WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/M1N(96)/DEC/W (Dec. 13,
1996), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min96_e/wtodece.htm (last visited
June 26, 2003).
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way be put into question." '153 Given its nature as an extension of trade
preferences, one could hardly attribute "protectionist purposes" to
the EC scheme.'54 At least with respect to core labor rights, evidence
from the OECD and other sources suggests that observance of these
does not threaten the comparative advantage of low-wage developing
countries, but may actually enhance it.'55
In sum, good reasons do not exist for excluding fundamental labor
rights from the ambit of the concept of "public morals." This means
that the focus of analysis would become whether the EU measures
are "necessary" for the "protection" of public morals. It would be
difficult for the European Union to make the case that its measures
are necessary, i.e. indispensable, because those countries that the
European Union can effectively encourage to improve labor rights
compliance would probably be encouraged to do so by other kinds of
incentives, such as subsidies and technical assistance.
In Korea-Beef,'56 the Appellate Body held that in some cases, a
provision of Article XX that contains a "necessity" test might justify
certain measures even if they are not "indispensable" to the objective
in question:
It seems to us that a treaty interpreter assessing a measure claimed to be
necessary to secure compliance of a WTO-consistent law or regulation
may, in appropriate cases, take into account the relative importance of the
common interests or values that the law or regulation to be enforced is
intended to protect. The more vital or important those common interests
or values are, the easier it would be to accept as 'necessary' a measure
designed as an enforcement instrument. There are other aspects of the
enforcement measure to be considered in evaluating that measure as
'necessary'. One is the extent to which the measure contributes to the
realization of the end pursued, the securing of compliance with the law or
153. See id. para. 4.
154. See id.
155. See Morici, supra note 126, at 76 (concluding "empirical evidence does not
support the notion that lax enforcement of [core labor standards] aids long-term
development. Effective enforcement within the WTO could be expected to
improve the circumstances of workers and the development prospects of countries
that played by the rules.").
156. Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef,
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS 16 I/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) (defining what is
a necessary measure).
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regulation at issue. The greater the contribution, the more easily a
measure might be considered to be 'necessary'. Another aspect is the
extent to which the compliance measure produces restrictive effects on
international commerce. 15
7
The importance of the common values or interests that the EU
measures intend to protect are obvious from the fact that they are the
subject of a multilateral declaration in the ILO that describes these in
terms of "fundamental" rights and principles. Moreover, in this case,
the restriction of commerce produced by the measure is minimal. It is
true that if the European Union were to provide the special
preferential tariff rate to all developing countries, regardless of labor
or environmental conditionality, it would have a less restrictive
impact on commerce because all developing countries already
benefit from significant margins of preference under the EC scheme.
Nevertheless, in considering the trade-restrictiveness of the EU
measure, it must be taken into account that the European Union
would be entirely within its rights in withdrawing the special
preferential treatment altogether, and offering it to no developing
country.'58
While the preferences in question are not indispensable, there is no
reason to believe they make a trivial contribution to the achievement
of compliance with the rights at issue, relative to other available
instruments.'59 The design and structure seem well suited to making a
significant contribution to the protection of the interests in question,
157. Id. paras. 162-63.
158. I do not mean to introduce here the simplistic notion that the EU measure is
merely a "carrot" not a "stick", or to suggest that under some competitive
conditions the selective granting of preferences of this kind could not achieve a
significant trade restriction or distorting effect. The inquiry here, however, is one
that concerns degree and nature of trade-restrictiveness, and this feature of the EU
measure is pertinent to making such a relative assessment. In its effects on the
behavior of individual market actors, granting of additional selective preferences
cannot be considered equivalent to the withdrawal or suspension of bound
concessions on the legal security of which market actors may have been expected
to rely in their economic decision-making.
159. See Elliott, supra note 16 (noting the positive impact of GSP conditionality
on labor practices). Admittedly, Elliott's empirical study does not address the same
preferences challenged by India.
1372 [18:1333
BACK TO THE COURTAFTER SHRIMP/TURTLE
as it provides a meaningful incentive to developing countries to
improve and maintain compliance with fundamental labor rights.
2. Article XX(b) Protection of Human Life and Health
At least two of the fundamental labor rights indexed to the EC
scheme clearly relate to the protection of human life and health.
Those include the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory
labor, and the effective abolition of child labor. Such labor practices
notoriously endanger human life and health. A relationship between
the other rights, e.g. freedom of association, the effective recognition
of the right to collective bargain, and the elimination of
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, could also
plausibly be connected to health, understood broadly as physical and
psychological well-being. 160 The other issues concerning whether the
EU measures fit under Article XX(b) are quite similar to those that
exist for Article XX(a). 16 1
3. Article XX(e) Prison Labor
It has been suggested that a teleological interpretation of Article
XX(e) might extend the provision to include measures that address
the right against forced labor generally. 62  However, such
interpretations are unsustainable under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. 63 The ordinary meaning of the word "prison" does
not encompass other non-penal settings, even if they entail coercion.
160. See, e.g., World Health Organization, World Health Declaration, Health for
All-Policy (May 16, 1998), available at
http://www.who.int/archives/hfa/policy.htm (last visited June 26, 2003) (describing
how rights to health and physical well-being can also include psychological well-
being).
161. See supra Part III(A)(i) and accompany notes (discussing the idea of public
morals with reference to labor rights conditionality under GATT Article XX).
162. See, e.g., Morici, supra note 126 (commenting that enforcement of labor
standards would promote trade).
163. Cf, e.g., Beef Hormones, supra note 48 (illustrating the Appellate Body's
decisions that continuously establish unsustainable interpretations).
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4. The Chapeau ofArticle XX
Once the EU labor rights measures fall into one of the heads of
Article XX, the remaining issue, under the "chapeau" of Article XX,
is whether these measures will apply in a manner that gives rise to
unjustified or arbitrary discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail. The Shrimp/Turtle rulings illuminate the
meaning of unjustified and arbitrary discrimination where Article
XX measures condition market access on the exporting member's
policies.' 6' The requirement to avoid unjustified discrimination
implies that the way conditionality in the measure is applied should
be sufficiently flexible as to permit the exporting member to satisfy
the conditionality in a manner appropriate to its own conditions and
circumstances. 65 The exporting country is required only to adopt it
into domestic legislation and apply the substance of the labor rights
in the ILO Conventions. The EU regulation thus provides the
exporting country with flexibility with respect to the legal and
regulatory modalities by which it implements this substance.
Moreover, the regulation provides the Commission with discretion to
grant special preferential treatment to products from certain
particular sectors or areas of the country, in cases where the
legislation applies only to those sectors and not throughout the
country. Finally, while the exporting country must report the
effective measures taken to implement and monitor these provisions
to the Commission, the European Union leaves it up to the exporting
country to devise implementation and monitoring measures, as long
as these are effective. 166 In sum, the EC scheme, on its face, does not
contain features that would give rise to "unjustified
discrimination."'' 67 The European Commission should be able to
164, See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, para. 121 (recognizing that one cannot
assume that requiring export countries to comply with a certain policies would
automatically render a measure incapable of justification under Article XX).
165. See Shrimp/Turtle 11, supra note 1, para. 56 (relying on the fact the more
flexible application of the U.S. measure in order to find the measure justifiable
under Article XX of the GATT 1994).
166. See generally Council Regulation 2501/01, supra note 15 (noting the
flexibility of requirements under the EU measures)
167. See Shrimp/Turtle 1, supra note 1, para. 14 (defining "unjustifiable
discrimination" as "discrimination between countries where the same conditions
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make a prima facie case that its scheme conforms to this condition of
the chapeau and then India would have had to allege specific
instances where the Commission and its officials have applied the
scheme in a manner that gives rise to unjustified discrimination.
India did not participate in the scheme and the Commission and its
officials have not found any specific instances of unjustified
discrimination.
As for the "arbitrary discrimination" within the meaning of the
Chapeau, the EC scheme provides transparent criteria against which
a developing country applying for the special preferences must
meet. 68 The relevant authorities of the applicant developing country
"are invited to cooperate" in the Commission's investigation of
whether or not the country meets the criteria for the granting of the
special preferences. These features on the face of the EC scheme
should be sufficient to discharge the burden of proof to make a prima
facie case that the scheme itself conforms to the chapeau prohibition
on "arbitrary discrimination." It would then be up to India again to
allege any instances where the European Commission has engaged in
"arbitrary discrimination" while applying the scheme.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONALITY
1. Article XX(g)
Based upon the Appellate Body's reading of "exhaustible natural
resources" in the Shrimp/Turtle case,'69 it would seem certain that
measures to conserve tropical forests and their ecosystems would
come within Article XX(g) of the GATT. A wide variety of
international activities in this regard, including the various policy
statements and guidelines of the ITTO, a multilateral organization
whose members include both countries with tropical forest and those
that are consumers of tropical forest products confirm that the
prevail.., where the policy goal of the Article XX exception being applied
provides a rationale for the justification").
168. See Council Regulation 2501/01, supra note 15, para. 7 (detailing what
developing countries must show in applying for special preferences).
169. See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, para. 128 (deciding that "exhaustible"
natural resources and "renewable" natural resources are not mutually exclusive)
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sustainability of tropical forests and their ecosystems is a legitimate
and important policy goal, and a pressing environmental priority.17 °
Providing a tangible incentive for developing countries to implement
internationally acknowledged standards and guidelines concerning
sustainable management of tropical forests seem to have a real and
close connection with the policy objective of conserving these
exhaustible natural resources.
Article XX(g) includes the condition that the measures in question
are "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption."'' Since there are no tropical forests
within the European Union, the focus here would naturally be on
restrictions on domestic consumption. In this regard, the European
Union is progressively taking effective steps to halt the importation
of tropical timber harvested in violation of the laws of the exporting
country. These restrictions on consumption of tropical timber clearly
relate to the effectiveness of the EU trade preferences. To the extent
that illegally harvested timber can find a market in the European
Union, a major consumer, the incentives for compliance with
domestic legislation, including the legislation that developing
countries are encouraged to provide and enforce by the EU
preferences, will be undermined, with consequent negative effects on
the conservation of forests.
Finally, the issue of territorial nexus may arise, one on which the
Appellate Body did not pronounce as a matter of law in
Shrimp/Turtle. As the various policy statements of the ITTO and the
international community more generally on the issue of sustainable
forestry show, tropical forests and their ecosystems, have a global
"commons" or public good dimension. This "commons" dimension
170. See ITTO Guidelines, supra note 19 (outlining guidelines for forest
management and protection). See generally Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, para.
123. Action under Article XX(g), as the Appellate Body emphasized in the
Shrimp/Turtle implementation ruling, does not require the existence of a
multilateral treaty. Sustainable forest management is an important and legitimate
goal of public policy, and a matter that transcends the particular interests of
individual consumer and producer countries.
171. GATT, supra note 61, art. XX(g).
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creates an appropriate nexus with the interests of the European
Union. 1 72
2. The Chapeau ofArticle XX
With respect to unjustified discrimination, EU preferences are
based on implementation of internationally accepted guidelines and
standards, which are principally those developed through the ITTO.
Because such guidelines and standards are agreed among a wide
variety of both producer and consumer countries, they reflect
flexibility and sensitivity with respect to conditions in different
countries, and do not seek to impose or copy the regulatory approach
of any single jurisdiction. Moreover, the EU preference scheme
requires only that developing countries implement such standards
and guidelines to provide a further margin of flexibility to adapt
them to local conditions.
The EC scheme confers a large measure of discretion on the
Commission to determine whether implementation, monitoring, and
enforcement meet the conditionality requirements. A developing
country has the right to know why the Commission denied it a
preferential status. The WTO doctrine does not find a violation of
WTO legal requirements merely based on the discretion afforded to a
decision-maker. State responsibility normally is engaged in when the
exercise of discretionary powers granted by the statute lead to
violations of WTO law. This view of state responsibility is especially
applicable to the conditions of the chapeau of Article XX, since the
conditions in the chapeau govern the application of a legislative or
regulatory scheme, rather than its general structural features or
characteristics. Absent evidence of specific incidences where the
Commission has acted arbitrarily, 73 it would seem premature to
172. By "commons" here is not implied a legal state of affairs where individual
states have ceded jurisdiction to control forests within their territory; rather, that,
conceptually, the way that one state exercises, or fails to exercise that jurisdiction,
may have significant effects on other states and the international community in
general, thus leading other states and the international community to have a
legitimate interest in how domestic jurisdiction is exercised.
173. Examples of arbitrary behavior include giving vague or inconsistent
reasons for denial of preferential status, or interpreting the "substance" of
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conclude that the nature of the criteria or conditions in and of itself
results in "arbitrary discrimination."
CONCLUSION: THE POLICY AND ECONOMIC
STAKES IN A CHALLENGE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
AND LABOR CONDITIONALITY IN GSP
In this concluding section of the paper, I wish to speculate on the
political and economic consequences that would flow from various
possible outcomes, 174 had India gone forward with its claims
concerning the environmental and labor preferences. This analysis
may help to understand why India may have chosen not to pursue its
earlier claims. It may also help to grasp the likelihood and the
consequences of some other country challenging labor and
environmental conditionality.
A. SCENARIO #1: THE EU PREFERENCES UPHELD UNDER THE
ENABLING CLAUSE
If a panel and/or the Appellate Body find that the EU
environmental and/or labor preferences are consistent with the
Enabling Clause, at least Article 2(a), the policy status quo with
respect to GSP and the related issues of environmental and labor
conditionality would largely be preserved. WTO Members would be
able to operate voluntary GSP preference schemes outside the (strict)
scrutiny of the WTO adjudicator. A ruling on general jurisprudential
grounds would say little specific about the legitimacy of trade action
for labor and environmental purposes. On the other hand, it is
possible (though I believe unlikely, based on the analysis above), that
the WTO panel or Appellate Body could find that "non-
discrimination" is a strict legal condition of the Enabling Clause, but
that labor and environmental preferences are not discriminatory
because they are based on general and objective criteria applied
international standards and guidelines in an inconsistent or discriminatory manner
with respect to different applicants for preferential treatment.
174. I have selected only some of the possible outcomes, and not considered
others that I view as remote or largely insignificant variations, i.e. that the
Appellate Body would go one way on labor preferences and the opposite way on
the environmental preferences.
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equally to all developed countries. Such a statement would enhance
the legitimacy of the linkage between trade, labor, and environmental
issues, and would undermine the belief of the traditional trade policy
elite (including many WTO heads of delegation) that labor and
environmental conditionality is somehow inherently at odds with the
idea of non-discriminatory liberal trade. Such a ruling would
reinforce the decisions in Shrimp/Turtle, 75 and would legitimize the
linkage between trade and labor rights for a first time. It would
reinforce the position of "moderate" activists and civil society groups
that the WTO is not hostile to environmental and labor interests, but
would undermine the legitimacy of the current elite at the WTO,
which has sought to keep such questions "out" of the trading system.
B. SCENARIO #2: EU PREFERENCES UPHELD UNDER THE
ENABLING CLAUSE AND UNDER ARTICLE XX
The Appellate Body could hold that the EU preferences are legal,
despite GATT Article I because of both the Enabling Clause and
Article XX. Such a departure from strict judicial economy would
create a signal that labor and environmental linkages are legitimate
and appropriate within the WTO system. This would especially be
true if the Enabling Clause analysis derives its basis from general
jurisprudential grounds and the Appellate Body decides not to rule
specifically on any labor and environmental questions.
C. SCENARIO #3: EU PREFERENCES UPHELD UNDER ONLY
ARTICLE XX
The Appellate Body could find that the EU preferences are legal
simply under Article XX, and therefore find it unnecessary to
adjudicate the Enabling Clause. Such a ruling would not introduce
any new instability into the GSP, but would send a positive signal
about the legitimacy of labor and environmental linkages.
175. See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1.
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D. SCENARIO #4: EU PREFERENCES FAIL THE ENABLING CLAUSE
BUT UPHELD UNDER ARTICLE XX
Of all the outcomes where the EU measures are upheld, this one
would have the most dynamic effect on current debates and
negotiations within the WTO. If the EU preferences fail the Enabling
Clause, then this will send a signal that the individual elements of
members' GSP schemes will be subject to meaningful or even strict
scrutiny of the WTO dispute settlement organs. This will make GSP
preferences less attractive, from a political economy perspective, as
it will constrain the room to maneuver in balancing the interests of
different constituencies. Most of the selective or possibly
discriminatory features of GSP schemes have nothing to do with
labor and environmental concerns and this outcome would signal the
vulnerability of current GSP schemes to a challenge under the
Enabling Clause without the possibility of justification under GATT
Article XX. At the same time, there would also be a positive signal
concerning the legitimacy of labor and environmental linkages.
The GSP is already subject to much criticism, including a
sophisticated economic and political economy analysis that suggests
developing countries would be better off with deeper and bargained
MFN tariff cuts.'76 The outcome of striking down the EU preferences
based on the Enabling Clause may well give greater emphasis to
proposals in the current Round for significant tariff cuts that would
benefit developing countries. It could also further intensify the trend
towards regionalism, which enables countries to use other
mechanisms where they can operate selective and conditional
preferential trade policies. Concessions on a MFN basis in
multilateral negotiations may reduce the value of any preferential
treatment available to regional trading partners.
176. See Caglar Ozden & Eric Reinhardt, The Perversity of Preferences: GSP
and Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976-2000 (Apr. 9, 2002) (finding that
"countries removed from the GSP adopt more liberal trade policies than those
[countries] remaining eligible), available at
http://userwww.service.emory.edu/-erein/research/gsp2.pdf (last visited July 18,
2003).
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E. SCENARIO #5: EU PREFERENCES FAIL BOTH THE ENABLING
CLAUSE AND ARTICLE XX
This scenario would have a very significant impact on the trading
system. The result on the Enabling Clause will have the effects
discussed under Scenario #4. However, the fact that neither the
Enabling Clause nor Article XX can justify the labor and
environmental conditionality in preferences, it is very likely to
undermine the political equilibrium on the labor issue in the United
States. If the partisan balance changes in Congress after the next
congressional elections (in 2004), a ruling by the WTO Appellate
Body that narrowed or eliminated the possibility for labor
conditionality under GSP and more generally through Article XX
justification, could well lead to a reconsideration of the basis on
which Congress granted the President fast-track authority. And this
would occur in the final year or so of the Doha Round negotiations.
It should be noted that recently the United States has enacted new
sanctions against Burma, based in part on the condemnation of
Burma's record on labor rights by the International Labor
Organization. The legislation in question was passed by a virtually
unanimous vote in both the House and the Senate, which displays the
fact that at least in some cases the appropriateness of taking labor
and human rights-related trade action, indeed action much more
drastic than conditionality in GSP preferences, is widely felt across
the partisan divide in the US.
Finally, a WTO ruling of this nature, excluding even Article XX
justification of conditionality, is likely to reunite more moderate
activists who are critical but also hopeful for change at the WTO
with die-hard opponents of he international trade system. As a result,
a united front of "civil society" against the Doha Round would be a
possible outcome.
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